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Peer-to-peer rental markets have been shown to 
adversely impact the traditional hospitality industry and 
housing affordability, fueling the demand for 
regulation. While localities have implemented policies 
to address these issues, little is known about how rental 
suppliers respond to those regulations. Analyzing a 
policy implemented in New Orleans, which introduced 
annual bring-to-market costs while simultaneously 
banning listings from one city-center neighborhood, we 
reveal that hosts increase their prices as a result of the 
policy. We show that non-commercial hosts completely 
pass their additional costs onto their consumers. By 
contrast, commercial hosts with legalized listings 
located in the city center only partially pass on their 
costs to their guests, while decreasing prices in the rest 
of the city. Our results indicate that the policy falls short 
of reducing pressure on housing affordability in the city 
center, as peer-to-peer renting remains attractive when 
bring-to-market costs can easily be passed through to 
consumers. 
1. Introduction  
Peer-to-peer rental markets propose a new approach 
to temporarily delivering unused housing inventory 
from private owners to renters. Enabled by information 
technology and online marketplaces, peer-to-peer rental 
platforms (e.g. AirBnb) pave the way for improved 
usage efficiency of accommodations [1]. Meanwhile, 
the rapid growth of peer-to-peer rental platforms has 
famously disrupted traditional industries. Scholars have 
already uncovered the economic consequences resulting 
from the emergence of such markets, especially on 
residential house prices and rents [2] and the hotel 
industry [3]. These studies find that peer-to-peer rental 
market entries are blamed for raising housing prices and 
rents, while simultaneously reducing hotel revenues.  
Both scholarly [4] and anecdotal evidence [5] 
points towards a range of heterogeneous types of hosts, 
from individuals renting out their private homes to 
commercial suppliers with professional renting 
experience. However, only the former represent the set 
of hosts originally intended as the supply side of the 
most popular of such platforms, AirBnb [4]. Here, the 
intention is that individuals share their private spaces 
and enable paying guests to gain a genuine local 
experience [6]. In contrast, professional suppliers (e.g., 
hostels or vacation home providers) are seen to rent out 
standardized accommodations, abusing peer-to-peer 
rental platforms merely as a second mainstay to generate 
additional income [4, 7]. Anecdotal evidence also points 
to the increasing number of hosts with hundreds of 
listings [5]. These commercial suppliers, in particular, 
have heated up the public debate on commercialization 
of peer-to-peer rental platforms [8]. 
Naturally, these trends have attracted the attention 
of municipal governments, many of which having 
brought in regulatory policies with measures aimed at 
regulating the economic activity of peer-to-peer rentals 
in local markets [8]. Examples of such measures include 
restricting the areas in which they can operate (e.g., 
implemented Barcelona and Anaheim), or by levying 
additional fixed costs onto hosts in the form of licenses 
(e.g., implemented in Seattle and Denver). However, 
many of the governments are struggling with the 
enforcement of the regulations, resulting in ongoing 
disputes between local governments and peer-to-peer 
rental platforms (e.g., AirBnb) about removing illegal 
listings [9]. 
So, how do peer-to-peer rental suppliers, e.g., 
Airbnb hosts, in general respond to regulatory policies? 
For example, do they increase prices in cities which 
place restrictions on renting out private accommodation 
to temporary guests? Do commercial suppliers—as key 
drivers for the demand of regulatory action—react 
differently to these policies compared to private 
suppliers, such that commercializing debates cool down 
afterwards? Even though the aforementioned literature 
has informed us about the impact of peer rental markets 
on various traditional industries, there is little empirical 







research to date on how suppliers have responded to 
regulatory policies. This lack of knowledge presents a 
handicap to scholars, legislators, and consumers. For 
legislators, apart from the income generated from levies, 
their main aim is to mitigate the negative externalities, 
e.g., to avoid increases in housing prices and rents. Prior 
theoretical work [1] suggests that if bring-to-market 
costs (e.g., cleaning, managing the check-in, taxes) are 
borne by peer-rental suppliers, acquiring a property 
merely for the sake of peer-renting becomes relatively 
unappealing. This, in turn, can keep the increase in 
housing prices and rental rates at bay, which is a key aim 
for legislators. However, if bring-to-market costs can be 
passed through to guests partially or completely by 
increasing rental prices, peer-renting would still remain 
attractive. Hence, policymakers may fail to reduce the 
pressure on the housing market if bring-to-market costs 
can easily be passed through to the consumers.  
To shed light on the potentially different pricing 
responses by peer rental suppliers, we examine a 
regulatory policy in New Orleans that was announced in 
December 2016 and implemented in April 2017 [10]. 
This policy banned peer-to-peer rental suppliers from 
the French Quarter neighborhood, a popular tourist 
destination located in the city center. However, all 
listings in the remaining neighborhoods were legalized 
by establishing bring-to-market costs in form of annual 
licenses. The New Orleans city council aimed to address 
commercialization issues by offering different types of 
licenses. Commercial hosts, for example, have to pay 
$500 for their annual license for each listing, whereas a 
license for hosts being physically present during guest 
stays only costs $200 per year. We argue that the policy 
fundamentally reduces peer-to-peer rental supply in the 
French Quarter while simultaneously shifting the 
demand to legalized neighborhoods. As the supply in the 
rest of the city may either increase due to the legalization 
or decrease due to the bring-to-market costs, it remains 
unclear how different types of hosts will set prices in 
response to this new market situation. Hence, the aim of 
our study is to analyze the impact of these policy 
regulations on the prices charged by different types of 
peer rental suppliers. Thus, we formulate the following 
research question: How do commercial and non-
commercial peer rental suppliers set prices in response 
to a policy shift which affects supply, demand and bring-
to-market costs? 
Applying a difference-in-differences (DID) 
estimation strategy, we find that hosts on average 
respond to the policy shift by increasing prices up to 
3.4%. Moreover, we demonstrate that most of the non-
commercial hosts completely pass their additional costs 
to their guests. By contrast, we find that commercial 
hosts that are located in the vicinity of the French 
Quarter (where such rentals are banned) partially pass 
their additional bring-to-market costs to their guests, 
while even decreasing prices in the rest of the city.  
This paper makes several contributions to the 
literature. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to present empirical evidence that peer-to-peer rental 
suppliers do not always partially pass additional bring-
to-market costs onto their guests as suggested by theory 
[1]. While non-commercial suppliers completely pass 
the costs onto their guests, commercial suppliers set 
prices according to changes in demand and supply, 
which may even result in decreased prices for some 
regions. Although our findings contradict the 
predictions by theory, they match with previous 
literature pertaining to the heterogeneous price setting 
behavior of suppliers on peer-to-peer rental markets [7, 
11]. These studies had revealed that commercial hosts 
behave mostly as predicted by economic principles, by 
adjusting their prices more frequently than non-
commercial hosts in response to fluctuations in demand 
and supply. Our research also informs policy makers 
about the economic consequences of a policy which 
simultaneously introduces bring-to-market costs while 
banning supply from one specific neighborhood. Even 
though the policy makers in our study aimed to reduce 
peer-to-peer rental activity in the city center, 
neighborhoods located in the vicinity of the French 
Quarter, where such activity was banned, still remain an 
attractive location for peer-to-peer rental, especially for 
commercial suppliers. Thus, our results indicate that 
regulatory policies will only shift the problems 
associated with peer-to-peer rentals from one area to 
another. 
2. Related Literature 
We contribute to the literature stream on policy 
regulations for peer-to-peer short term rentals, where 
only a few empirically investigate the effect of actually 
implemented policy regulations. Alyakoob and Rahman 
(2021) investigate a policy shift in New Orleans that 
regulated short term rentals by introducing licensing 
costs [12]. Simultaneously, the city imposed a location 
restriction by banning short term rentals from the French 
Quarter, a tourist hotspot. They find that supply (i.e., the 
number of listings on Airbnb) in this area decreased 
after the policy shift had been implemented, while 
demand for short term rentals increased in adjacent 
districts. Considering policy shifts in multiple US cities, 
Chen et al. (2021) analyze changes in supply on Airbnb. 
A regulation implemented by some cities that require 
hosts to be present in the city when renting out their 
property has not been found to significantly affect 
supply [13]. By contrast, license costs levied on 
suppliers negatively affect supply in the short term but 




regulating the peer-to-peer rental market by requiring 
hosts to adhere to standards for health and safety (e.g., 
installing fire alarms) effectively reduces the number of 
listings in non-affluent neighborhoods [13]. Moreover, 
limiting hosts to rent out only one property is associated 
with both reduced rents in the long-term rental market 
and lowered home values in the for-sale housing market 
[14]. Policy shifts in general are associated with an 
overall decrease in the demand for short-term rentals in 
a city [15]. While these studies mainly focus on supply 
and demand, there is also evidence that rental suppliers 
increase their prices in response to a policy raising taxes 
being introduced. Airbnb hosts in particular react to a 
tax increase for short-term rentals by raising their prices 
and passing on (most of) their additional costs to 
consumers [16]. As outlined above, policy interventions 
often entail changes to demand and supply which in turn 
can affect price setting behavior. However, pricing 
responses by different types of hosts towards these kinds 
of policies have not yet been investigated. Therefore, 
this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to 
investigate how commercial and non-commercial 
suppliers, respectively, differ in their price reactions 
towards a policy shift. 
3. Theoretical Background 
Our empirical analysis builds on theoretical work 
that sheds light on the economic effects when bring-to-
market costs are introduced to a sharing market [1]. This 
theoretical model suggests that such an introduction is 
associated with a decrease in supply. As renting out a 
good suddenly entails additional costs for suppliers, it 
becomes less attractive to stay in the market. Thus, a 
trend towards own-use will be likely to occur in such a 
sharing market, resulting in a subsequently lowered 
supply side. A reduction in supply would imply an 
increased rental price in market equilibrium and 
therefore, the bring-to-market costs can be partially 
passed-through to the consumer. However, the degree of 
this pass-through depends on the elasticity of the 
demand- and supply side [1]. For example, if demand 
elasticity in a sharing market is sufficiently high 
compared to the supply elasticity, then the supply side 
could not pass through the additional bring-to-market 
costs, as demand would be drastically reduced in case of 
a price increase. By contrast, if supply elasticity is 
sufficiently high compared to the demand-side 
elasticity, then costs could be completely passed 
through to the consumers due to a surplus of demand. 
However, as neither the demand side nor the supply side 
will react completely inelastically in a real-world market 
setting, costs can always be passed through, up to a 
certain point [1]. Hence, if bring-to-market costs are 
exogenously introduced to a peer-to-peer rental market, 
theory hypothesizes that suppliers can partially pass 
those additional costs onto their consumers:  
Hypothesis 1 (Partial Cost Pass-Through Hypothesis): 
When additional bring-to-market costs are introduced 
to a peer-to-peer rental market, suppliers partially pass 
these costs to their guests by increasing rental prices.  
We extend these theoretical insights with empirical 
evidence pertaining to heterogeneity among the supply 
side in sharing markets [7, 11]. As research has already 
pointed out, commercial hosts with renting experience 
base their pricing behavior on seasonal demand patterns 
as well as on fluctuations in supply [7, 11]. Thus, 
commercial hosts tend to solve their profit maximization 
problem by setting prices according to changes in 
demand and supply, respectively. However, there is 
empirical evidence that non-commercial hosts with only 
little renting experience will exhibit price inefficiencies 
as they fail to charge higher prices in demand-peaking 
seasons [11]. So, when bring-to-market costs are 
introduced in a peer-to-peer rental market, empirical 
research suggests that different host types will also 
differ in their price setting as a response. In that sense, 
non-commercial suppliers will not act strategically by 
taking demand and supply changes into account. For 
example, they might oversee that there is a decrease in 
supply in the banned regions, a potential increase in 
supply in other regions due to the legalization, and a 
shift of demand from the banned neighborhood towards 
other regions. Instead, they may consider only their 
individual increase in bring-to-market costs. Hence, a 
complete cost-pass through of the additional costs by 
increasing rental prices is likely to occur for non-
commercial hosts. By contrast, we hypothesize that 
commercial suppliers will act more strategically by 
considering both demand- and supply changes as well 
as the additional bring-to-market costs when setting 
prices. Given the substantial differences in price setting 
behavior stemming from different host types on peer 
rental markets, we suggest that the supply side reacts 
heterogeneously to the introduction of bring-to-market 
costs: Hypothesis 2 (Differences for Host Types 
Hypothesis): When demand and supply are kept 
constant, non-commercial peer-to-peer rental suppliers 
pass on the additional bring-to-market costs to a larger 
extent to their guests, compared to commercial rental 
suppliers. 
4. Research Environment  
We analyze a policy shift in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, where regulators exogenously introduced 
additional bring-to-market costs to the short-term rental 
market in form of annual licenses for suppliers. In 
December 2016, following intensive discussions 




members, the city’s government voted to legalize and 
regulate short-term rentals. Previously, although these 
were indeed deemed illegal, AirBnb was nonetheless 
active in the city [12]. With effect from April 2017, the 
regulatory policy proposed by the city council 
essentially consisted of three parts [10]. First, it banned 
Airbnb activity from the French Quarter, a 
neighborhood that is particularly popular among 
tourists. Second, it legalized Airbnb activity in the rest 
of the city, requiring hosts to be licensed. Third, every 
Airbnb host needs to obtain an annual short-term rental 
(STR) license that comes in three different versions, 
with different restrictions for the host: accessory STR 
($200), temporary STR ($50-$150), and commercial 
STR ($500).  An accessory STR requires the owner 
occupant to be present during all of the occupancy and 
a temporary STR only allows a maximum of 90 rental 
nights per license per year. On the contrary, a 
commercial STR has no limitations on the number of 
rental nights per year and the owner does not need to be 
present during the rental period [10]. Given a time lag 
of four months between the announcement of the 
regulatory measure (December 2016) and the actual 
implementation (April 2017), we analyze this policy 
change over a one-year period, from August 2016 to 
August 2017. Thus, we have the opportunity to examine 
price setting behavior in the time before the 
announcement, during the four months between the 
announcement and the policy’s coming-into-effect, and 
in the first five months following its implementation. 
Figure 1 shows the timeline of events. 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of Events 
5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1. Data 
We collect monthly panel data from 
insideairbnb.com for all Airbnb listings available in 
New Orleans (our treatment city) and Portland, New 
York, and San Francisco (our control cities1) between 
August 2016 and August 2017 [17]. This dataset is used 
in various empirical studies on AirBnb [12, 15] and 
contains accommodation-level, host-level, review-level 
and booking rule-level information for each listing. The 
                                                 
1 Note that these cities were also subject to regulations prior to our observation period. However, when the regulations in New Orleans were 
implemented, there was no major adaption of the already existing policies. 
accommodation attributes include the listing price, the 
number of baths, bedrooms, guests, and amenities 
offered (e.g., wifi, smoke detectors), the distance to the 
city center, and dummies for the room type. Information 
on booking rules contain indicators for the possibility to 
instantly book the listing, the requirement to pay a 
cleaning fee and whether or not the listing requires a 
deposit. On a host level, we obtain data on how many 
months a host has been registered on Airbnb, whether 
they have acquired a superhost badge at a given month, 
whether their account has been verified with an official 
ID, and on their response behavior. We also have 
variables on the online ratings of a listing, for the overall 
rating as well as the six-dimensional ratings (e.g., 
cleanliness, communication, location).  
We enriched our panel dataset with publicly 
available data from the New Orleans Government 
indicating which hosts purchased a license for their 
listing during our observation period [10]. The resulting 
dataset allows us to not only distinguish legal from 
illegal listings, but also to observe which listings are 
linked to a commercial STR license, a temporary STR 
license, and an accessory STR license. We define 
commercial hosts as those who obtained a commercial 
STR license, as this type of license restricts only a few 
activities on AirBnb and therefore opens up space for 
commercial renting. Hosts with a temporary- or 
accessory STR license represent our subsample of non-
commercial hosts, as managing properties is highly 
restrictive in terms of renting duration and the physical 
presence for hosts. 
To gain a better understanding about the underlying 
market situation that hosts face when a regulatory policy 
is implemented, we additionally compute variables to 
proxy the demand and supply for each listing in each 
month. To proxy the demand a particular listing enjoys, 
we use the number of new reviews a listing obtains in a 
month multiplied by the minimum number of nights 
guests have to stay when booking the listing [2, 3, 12]. 
As AirBnb only allows reviews of guests who have 
spent at least one night at a listing, this measure is a 
lower bound metric for the demand of a listing 
(𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅). As an upper bound for the 
demand of a listing, we examine the listing’s calendar, 
counting the number of days a listing was unavailable 
over a period of a month, either because the listing was 
fully booked or because the host was not offering any 
listing on a given day (𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑅). To proxy 
the supply of listings available on Airbnb, we count the 
number of other Airbnb listings within a 1-mile radius 
around the focal listing in each month. This measure is 




us to control for the competitive landscape around a 
focal listing in a fine-grained manner. Moreover, we 
compute a variable indicating how many listings are 
located in the center of each city in our dataset by 
counting the number of listings within a maximum 
distance of 1 mile to the city center 
(𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅). We also create a variable 
that additionally considers the number of illegal listings 
in the city center (i.e., listings located in the banned 
French Quarter) for listings located in New Orleans 
(𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝐹𝑄). Finally, we compute the total 
number of listings for each city and each month, 
representing a more general proxy for supply 
(𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇). 
To rule out that hosts enter Airbnb due to the policy 
shift, we only include listings in our dataset that were 
set up before the policy implementation in April 2017 
(our main treatment). Moreover, we excluded the illegal 
listings located in the French Quarter from our sample. 
In total, our panel data set comprises 87,122 listings 
operated by 66,624 hosts. Of the 6,968 listings that are 
located in New Orleans, we found 2,072 listings 
(29.7%) that are also represented in the STR licenses 
dataset. Of those, 267 (3.8%) can be linked to a 
commercial STR license, 1,045 (15.0%) to a temporary 
STR license, and 760 (10.9%) to an accessory STR 
license. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 164.73 259.89 
𝑁𝑈𝑀_𝐺𝑈𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑆 3.03 2.01 
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑀 0.03 0.16 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑀 0.43 0.50 
𝑊𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑀 0.54 0.50 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅 5.87 10.01 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑅 20.56 11.04 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 1837.7 1334 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅 1821.3 598.3 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝐹𝑄 1849.2 554.78 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 30615 155867 
𝐼𝑆_𝑆𝑈𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇 0.13 0.34 
 
Table 1 reports an excerpt of the summary statistics 
of our panel dataset. The statistics represent monthly 
averages from our observation period spanning 13 
months. 
5.2. Main Variables 
As the dependent variable, we use the listing price 
in $US for one night (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸). Our two main 
independent variables are 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 and 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁. The regulatory policy we analyze in New 
Orleans essentially consists of two components, namely 
the French Quarter ban on the one hand and the 
requirement to obtain a license in the rest of the city on 
the other. We assume that all of the listings in New 
Orleans should be affected by the licensing system, as 
each host is obliged to purchase a license after the policy 
had come into effect. Therefore, the first treatment 
variable 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 equals 1 if the listing is 
located in New Orleans and is thus required to be 
licensed, and 0 if it is located elsewhere. Conversely, we 
assume that the second component of this policy, the 
French Quarter ban, is particularly influential for 
listings located in the nearby neighborhood, as demand 
may shift from the banned region to adjacent legalized 
listings after the policy implementation [12]. That is 
why our second treatment variable (𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁) is set 
to 1 if the listing is located near the French Quarter, with 
a maximum distance of one mile, and 0 otherwise. 
Figure 2 depicts the geographical distribution of our 
treatment groups.  
 
 
The blue bubbles represent all listings for which the 
variable 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 equals 1 and 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁 
equals 0. The orange bubbles show all listings that have 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁 as well as 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 set to 1. In 
that sense, all listings located near the French Quarter 
(the orange bubbles) are affected by both the French 
Quarter ban (𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁) and the licensing system 
(𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸). The construction of our treatment 
groups allows us to differentiate between the two 
components of the regulatory policy and their 
corresponding relationship with host’s pricing behavior. 
However, due to the fact that all listings that are affected 
by the French Quarter ban are also affected by the 
licensing system, we only observe the effect of 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁 in relation to the effect of 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸. 
5.3. Empirical Model 
We estimate a DID model with multiple 
interactions between our treatment specifications and 
monthly time dummies, as depicted in equation 1. 
 




ln⁡(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ∙ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑗 ∗
𝑇
𝑗=1
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑖 +⁡∑ 𝛿𝑗 ∙ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁𝑖
𝑇
𝑗=1 +
+⁡∑ 𝜃𝑗 ∙ 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=1 + 𝛽3𝛾𝑖𝑡 +⁡𝛿𝑖 +⁡ 𝑖𝑡 ⁡⁡  
(1) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡) represents the natural logarithm of the 
price for one night of listing 𝑖⁡in month 𝑡. Then, we 
incorporate month dummy variables in our 
specification, where the dummy 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑗  represents 
a single month 𝑗 that is set to 1 if 𝑡⁡equals 𝑗. The key 
variables of interest are the interactions 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑗 ∗
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑖 and 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁𝑖 
which represent the DID estimators and capture the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) listings. 
Here, we leave out December 2016 (the policy 
announcement month) and its respective interaction 
terms from our regression, such that they serve as a 
reference point for the interpretation of subsequent (and 
prior) prices [14]. We also add listing fixed effects 
𝛿𝑖⁡which capture both of our treatment variables and 
allow us to control for time-constant heterogeneity 
across listings. Finally, 𝛾𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control 
variables (host-level, accommodation-level, and 
booking-level information)⁡and 𝑖𝑡 is a random error 
term.  
In a second model, we add the demand proxies for 
each listing (𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅, 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑅), 
as well as our supply variables (𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿, 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅, 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅_𝐹𝑄,  
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌_𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇)  from the preceding month (𝑡 − 1) 
for each listing 𝑖 into our vector of control variables, 
which may elucidate the mechanisms behind hosts’ 
price setting behavior. When we control for all these 
variables and thus keep them constant, we can conclude 
how many hosts change their prices irrespective of 
policy-driven changes in 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌. 
Therefore, this controlling mechanism allows us to 
observe how much of the hypothesized partial cost pass-
through can be explained by fluctuations in 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 
and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 following the introduction of the policy. 
5.4. Results 
Table 2 presents our empirical results when 
estimating equation (1). First, the insignificant 
coefficients of the interaction terms in nearly all 
columns before December 2016 indicate insignificant 
trends before the policy was announced, which supports 
the common trends assumption [18]. In the following, 
we discuss the policy effect on all listings in New 
Orleans (column (1) and (2)), on listings of commercial 
suppliers (column (3) and (4)), and on listings of non-
commercial suppliers (column (5) – (8)) separately. 
 
5.4.1. Policy Effect on all Listings in New Orleans. 
Column (1) displays the results for the model assessing 
the general policy effect on all listings (i.e., listings with 
and without a valid license) in New Orleans without 
controlling for 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌. We find a 
significant price increase of 1.3% immediately after the 
announcement of the policy shift in January 2017, 
compared to the prices in December 2016. This price 
increase grows to 3.4% in April 2017 and diminishes 
gradually in magnitude to 0.1% by June 2017 but 
remains positive and statistically significant. The mostly 
insignificant coefficients for the interactions between 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁 and the respective months in column (1) 
indicate that listings located in the vicinity of the French 
Quarter do not respond differently to the policy in terms 
of prices, compared to all the other remaining listings in 
New Orleans. In column (2), we assess the underlying 
mechanisms behind hosts’ price setting behavior by 
simultaneously controlling for each listing’s 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 
and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌. We see that, except for the interactions of 
January 2017 and June 2017 with 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸, 
the coefficients still remain positive and significant and 
are on a similar level as in column (1). This means due 
to facing additional costs arising from STR licenses, 
keeping demand and supply constant, Airbnb hosts 
increase their prices over a period of at least 6 months 
and therefore pass on the additional bring-to-market 
costs to their guests. To break down the additional 
amount of dollars that each listing generates, we 
multiply the base month price (December 2016) by our 
estimate of the price increase in month 𝑡 and by the 
average lower bound demand per listing in month 𝑡. 
During the time span from January 2017 to August 
2017, this results in approximately $128 of additional 
revenue per listing in New Orleans. Considering that 
hosts have to pay $500 for an annual commercial 
license, $200 per year for an accessory license, and 
between $50 (with homestead exemption) and $150 
(without homestead exemption) for a temporary license, 
we generally find support for Hypothesis 1 (Partial Cost 
Pass-Through Hypothesis). However, AirBnb hosts 
increase their prices even after controlling for monthly 
demand and supply which is not captured by the theory 
we aim to test. 
 
5.4.2. Policy Effect on Listings with a Commercial 
STR License. In the following columns, we obtain a 
more nuanced picture of the policy’s effect on listing 
prices by estimating the regression separately for 
listings assigned to a specific license type. Column (3) 
depicts the policy effect on listings with a commercial 
STR license (i.e., commercial hosts). Here, we even 
observe decreasing prices in New Orleans outside the 




Table 2: Regression Results 
Variable 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸) 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑡−1  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌𝑡−1  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 



















































𝐷𝑒𝑐′16 ∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 
(Policy Announcement) 
omitted 




























































































































































































𝐷𝑒𝑐′16 ∙ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁 
(Policy Announcement) 
omitted 









































































































































Listing Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Monthly Fixed Effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Listing Fixed Effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 702,118 611,974 646,904 566,917 655,815 574,977 652,826 572,387 
R² 0.980 0.983 0.981 0.983 0.981 0.983 0.981 0.983 
Note: Interaction terms of Aug’16 are dropped due to the demand- and supply lag computations. The large number of observations (N) 




Starting in May 2017, listing prices drop by 2.9%, 
whereby the coefficients remain negative and 
statistically significant until August 2017. However, 
listings of commercial hosts that are located with spatial 
proximity to the French Quarter experience an increase 
in prices. For example, in June 2017, commercial 
listings located in adjacent neighborhoods to the banned 
French Quarter raise their listing price by about 1.4% (-
0.033 + 0.047 = 0.014, the sum of coefficients for the 
interaction terms of 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 and 
𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁). When controlling for 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 (see column (4)), the interaction terms 
between the months and 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 mostly 
become insignificant and smaller in magnitude. Thus, 
our results suggest that the decreasing prices we observe 
from commercial listings can be primarily attributed to 
policy-related changes in demand and supply. We also 
calculate the additional amount of dollars each 
commercially-licensed listing generates after the 
policy’s announcement. During the time span from 
January 2017 to August 2017, the average revenue per 
listing due to policy-related price changes is 
approximately $231 (for listings located in New 
Orleans’ city center) and -$56 (for other listings in New 
Orleans). We conclude that a partial cost pass-through 
is also observable for hosts with a commercial STR 
license located in the vicinity of the French Quarter but 
not for commercial hosts located in the rest of New 
Orleans. Moreover, we provide evidence that the pricing 
behavior of commercial hosts is mainly driven by 
policy-related changes in 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌. 
 
5.4.3. Policy Effect on Listings with a Temporary or 
Accessory STR License. As column (5) and column (7) 
depict, hosts managing properties with either a 
temporary or an accessory STR license (i.e., non-
commercial hosts) change their prices in response to the 
policy. In particular, temporary licensed listings 
significantly increased their prices over a period of 7 
months (February 2017 – August 2017), compared with 
6 months (January 2017 – July 2017) for hosts with an 
accessory license. In both models, price rises peak in 
April 2017 with a 4.7% increase for temporary STR 
listings and 4.0% for accessory STR listings. Unlike 
commercially-licensed listings, properties with a 
temporary or accessory STR license located near the 
French Quarter do not ask for higher prices compared to 
listings located outside this area. When controlling for 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 (see column (6) and column 
(8)), temporary and accessory licensed listings still 
exhibit an increase in prices for a period of at least 3 
months (February 2017 to May 2017). This suggests that 
non-commercial hosts increase their prices irrespective 
from supply and demand. However, the price elevations 
observed in June 2017 for example, are mainly 
applicable to changes in 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌. The 
higher price levels for those listings result in additional 
revenues of approximately $373 for a temporary 
licensed listing and $145 for an accessory licensed 
listing from January 2017 to August 2017. Note that 
these values only represent a lower bound for the 
additional revenue, as it is computed by using 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷_𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅 and the respective price increases 
after the policy has been announced. However, as a 
temporary STR license costs between $50 (with 
homestead exemption) and $150 (without homestead 
exemption), our results indicate that hosts managing a 
temporary licensed property pass on all of the additional 
license costs to their guests, even generating additional 
income as a result of the policy. By contrast, accessory 
licensed listings recoup at least 72.5% of the license 
costs within the following eight months after the policy 
announcement. As an accessory license allows listings 
to be rented out over the whole year, it seems plausible 
that these hosts also recoup the additional costs entirely 
within a licensing year.  
Our results reveal that the underlying mechanisms 
for price changes differ per license type. While hosts 
with a temporary- or accessory-licensed property 
respond to the policy by increasing prices and 
completely pass their additional costs onto their guests, 
irrespective from changes in 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌, 
for hosts with a commercial license outside the city 
center, the flux in 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 and 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐿𝑌 plays a major 
role for their pricing responses, resulting in even lower 
prices after the policy has been introduced. Given the 
sizeable differences in price setting behavior that are 
found for hosts with different licenses, we also find 
support for Hypothesis 2 (Differences for Host Types 
Hypothesis). 
5.5. Robustness Checks 
One potential concern could be that our results are 
confounded because the listings in New Orleans are 
systematically different from those in our control group. 
To alleviate this concern, we identify listings in the 
control group cities that are statistical twins of the New 
Orleans ones, using propensity score matching (PSM) 
[19]. We apply a kernel matching algorithm, use the 
aforementioned control variables as matching variables 
and matched the variables for the last month before the 
policy was implemented (March 2017). Assessing the 
relative bias before and after matching each covariate, 
we see that our PSM has substantially reduced the bias 
between the treatment and the control listings. We re-
run all the regression models from our baseline results 
and find qualitatively unchanged results. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that systematic differences between treatment 




As a significant proportion of hosts with listings 
located in New Orleans did not purchase a license 
during our observation period, one might also be 
concerned that our results for all listings in New Orleans 
might primarily be driven by illegally posted listings. 
Therefore, we re-run our baseline model, restricting our 
dataset to listings with a valid license. Here, the 
coefficients for the interactions of 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐸 
remain qualitatively unchanged. However, the 
interaction of 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇_𝐵𝐴𝑁 and the months after the 
policy implementation now become significant, which 
might be explained by price increases of commercially-
licensed listings in the center of the city.  
Lastly, to rule out any distortions created by hosts 
who could have established an Airbnb listing before the 
policy implementation (our main treatment) because of 
the announcement of the policy, we re-run our analysis 
only with listings that were established even before the 
policy announcement in December 2016. Again, we find 
qualitatively unchanged results. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
Peer-to-peer rental platforms have been met with 
increasingly rigorous regulatory intervention from 
municipal governments aiming to minimize the negative 
externalities of the peer-to-peer rental market to local 
communities, as documented in prior literature [2, 3]. 
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to 
empirically evaluate such a regulatory policy for 
different host types, which entailed the ban of Airbnb in 
a certain neighborhood in the center of a city, its 
legalization in others, and the introduction of mandatory 
licenses. Our results demonstrate that hosts have 
increased their prices in response to the announcement 
and implementation of the policy. We calculate that 
hosts approximately earn $128 of additional revenue in 
the first eight months after the policy came into effect. 
Yet, we discern big differences in the pricing behavior 
between heterogeneous host types, i.e., commercial and 
non-commercial hosts. Non-commercial hosts increase 
their prices mostly irrespective of demand and supply, 
resulting in either a complete pass-through of the 
additional licensing costs, or an increase exceeding that 
cost. By contrast, commercial hosts located outside the 
city center decrease their prices due to the increase of 
competition within the city. However, a partial cost 
pass-through of the additional bring-to-market costs is 
also observable for commercial hosts in the center of the 
city. 
Theoretically, our results imply that when bring-to-
market costs are introduced to a sharing market, the 
suggested partial cost pass-through [1], which depends 
on the elasticity of the demand- and supply side, is only 
observable for commercial hosts located in an area with 
a substantial decrease in supply. For other regions we 
even find decreasing pricing responses from 
commercial hosts. Furthermore, our results suggest that 
the theoretical model proposed by the literature is not 
directly applicable to non-commercial hosts. As those 
hosts rather act as inexperienced microentrepreneurs, 
they simply pass on all the additional bring-to-market 
costs to their consumers without considering changes on 
the demand- and supply side. Hence, our empirical 
results require an extension of theoretical models in 
sharing markets in two major ways. First, theory needs 
to account for heterogeneous types of suppliers with 
differentiated economic behavior, and second, 
geographical aspects need explicit and thorough   
consideration, as pricing behavior is fundamentally 
affected when supply shifts from one area to another. 
Practically, our results inform policy makers about the 
economic effects of a regulatory measure which 
simultaneously bans short-term rentals from one area 
and legalizes it in others, requiring suppliers to obtain 
an annual license. We provide evidence that a licensing 
system, which introduces additional bring-to-market 
costs for suppliers, causes the average host to increase 
their listing prices. However, as non-commercial hosts 
are seen to pass through all the additional licensing costs 
to their guests, peer-to-peer renting continues to remain 
attractive for suppliers. Commercial hosts who operate 
listings with spatial proximity to the French Quarter also 
pass through the additional costs to their guests, albeit 
only partially, implying that the city center in particular 
remains appealing to commercial suppliers despite the 
introduction of the policy. As most of the commercial 
hosts are represented in neighborhoods adjacent to the 
French Quarter, it seems plausible that the problems 
associated with home sharing markets will merely shift 
from one area to another. Taken together, although the 
policy reduced AirBnb activity in the banned French 
Quarter and thus may help reduce pressure on the 
housing market in this area [12], adjacent 
neighborhoods might now suffer due to the policy. In 
that sense, anecdotal evidence in New Orleans points 
towards problems arising in the Garden District, a 
neighborhood located directly next to the French 
Quarter. Citizens report that they have lost lots of 
neighbors due to the proliferation of short-term rentals 
[20]. As a response, New Orleans city council voted to 
impose new restrictions on short-term rentals in 2019, 
including a prohibition of AirBnb activity in the Garden 
District [19]. However, to avoid another shift of AirBnb 
supply towards adjacent neighborhoods, our results 
suggest that policy makers could consider allowing only 
temporary licenses for owner occupants in all areas of 
the city. 
As with any research, this study also comes with 




regulations implemented in New Orleans, which 
arguably limits the transferability of these results to 
other regions. Nonetheless, we have no reason to believe 
that the general directions of our results, or the 
heterogeneous reactions among rental suppliers, should 
be much different in other cities. That is why our results 
are at the least suggestive for other regions. Moreover, 
as some hosts did report their license code inaccurately 
on the AirBnb website, some licenses could not be 
mapped to the listings.  
Future research could extend our analysis by 
investigating the price effects of peer rental suppliers in 
other cities where regulators introduce similar bring-to-
market costs. In particular, an analysis of the 
implementation of heterogeneous bring-to-market costs 
according to host types is worth further investigation. In 
that sense, it would be interesting to not only analyze 
price setting behavior, but also the development of the 
market share of commercial and non-commercial 
suppliers. Furthermore, future research could refine our 
analysis by extending our datasets with hotel sales data, 
and thus allowing to take a more differentiated view on 
the competitive environment faced by peer-to-peer 
rental suppliers. Finally, as our research only analyzes 
the policy effect on peer-to-peer short term rentals in a 
one-year period, future research could investigate the 
long-term effects of such policy measures. In that sense, 
it would be particularly interesting for scholars, policy-
makers and property owners, to further study the 
effectiveness of policies regulating short-term rentals in 
curbing the increase of house prices and rental rates in 
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